Tight Bounds for Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games by Gairing, Martin et al.
Tight Bounds for Cost-Sharing in Weighted
Congestion Games?
Martin Gairing1, Konstantinos Kollias2, and Grammateia Kotsialou1
1 University of Liverpool, Liverpool, Merseyside L69 3BX, UK
2 Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA
Abstract. This work studies the price of anarchy and the price of sta-
bility of cost-sharing methods in weighted congestion games. We require
that our cost-sharing method and our set of cost functions satisfy certain
natural conditions and we present general tight price of anarchy bounds,
which are robust and apply to general equilibrium concepts. We then
turn to the price of stability and prove an upper bound for the Shapley
value cost-sharing method, which holds for general sets of cost functions
and which is tight in special cases of interest, such as bounded degree
polynomials. Also for bounded degree polynomials, we close the paper
with a somehow surprising result, showing that a slight deviation from
the Shapley value has a huge impact on the price of stability. In fact, for
this case, the price of stability becomes as bad as the price of anarchy.
1 Introduction
The class of weighted congestion games [16, 17] encapsulates a large collection of
important applications in the study of the inefficiencies induced by strategic be-
havior in large systems. The applications that fall within this framework involve
a set of players who place demands on a set of resources. As an example, one of
the most prominent such applications is selfish routing in a telecommunications
or traffic network [3, 8, 20]. When more total demand is placed on a resource,
the resource becomes scarcer, and the quality of service experienced by its users
degrades. More specifically, in weighted congestion games there is a set of play-
ers N and a set of resources E. Each player i ∈ N has a weight wi > 0 and she
gets to select the subset of the resources that she will use. The possible subsets
she can pick are given in her set of possible strategies, Pi. Once players make
their decisions, each resource e ∈ E generates a joint cost fe · ce(fe), where fe is
the total weight of the users of e and ce is the cost function of e. The joint cost of
a resource is covered by the set of players Se using e, i.e.,
∑
i∈Se χie = fe ·ce(fe),
where χie is the cost share of player i on resource e.
The way the cost shares χie are calculated is given by the cost-sharing method
used in the game. A cost-sharing method determines the cost-shares of the play-
ers on a resource, given the joint cost that each subset of them generates, i.e., the
cost shares are functions of the state on that resource alone. In most applications
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of interest, it is important that the cost-sharing method possesses this locality
property, since we expect the system designer’s control method to scale well with
the size of the system and to behave well as resources are dynamically added to
or removed from the system. Altering our cost-sharing method of choice changes
the individual player costs. Given that our candidate outcomes are expected
to be game-theoretic equilibrium solutions, this modification of the individual
player costs also changes the possible outcomes players can reach. The price of
anarchy (POA) and the price of stability (POS) measure the performance of a
cost-sharing method by comparing the worst and best equilibrium, respectively,
to the optimal solution, and taking the worst-case ratio over all instances.
Certain examples of cost-sharing methods include proportional sharing (PS)
and the Shapley value (SV). In PS, the cost share of a player is proportional to
her weight, i.e., χie = wi · ce(fe), while the SV of a player on a resource e is
her average marginal cost increase over a uniform ordering of the players in Se.
Other than different POA and POS values, different cost-sharing methods also
possess different equilibrium existence properties. The pure Nash equilibrium
(PNE) is the most widely accepted solution concept in such games. In a PNE,
no player can improve her cost with a unilateral deviation to another strategy.
In a mixed Nash equilibrium (MNE) players randomize over strategies and no
player can improve her expected cost by picking a different distribution over
strategies. By Nash’s famous theorem, a MNE is guaranteed to exist in every
weighted congestion game. However, existence of a PNE is not guaranteed for
some cost-sharing methods. As examples, PS does not guarantee equilibrium
existence (see [12] for a characterization), while the SV does. In [11], it is shown
that only the class of generalized weighted Shapley values (see Section 2 for a
definition) guarantees the existence of a PNE in such games.
As a metric that is worst-case by nature, the POA of a method that does not
always induce a PNE must be measured with respect to more general concepts,
such as the MNE, which are guaranteed to exist. Luckily, POA upper bounds
are typically robust [18] which means they apply to MNE and even more general
classes (such as correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria). On the other hand,
the motivations behind the study of the POS assume a PNE will exist, hence
the POS is more meaningful when the method does guarantee a PNE.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this work we make two main contributions, one with respect to the POA and
one with respect to the POS.
General POA bounds: On the POA side, we present tight bounds for general
classes of allowable cost functions and for general cost-sharing methods, i.e.,
we parameterize the POA by (i) the set of allowable cost functions (which
changes depending on the application under consideration) and (ii) the cost-
sharing method. To obtain our tight bounds we make use of the following natural
assumptions, which we explain in more detail in Section 2:
1. Every cost function in the game is continuous, nondecreasing, and convex.
2. Cost-sharing is consistent when player sets generate costs in the same way.
3. The cost share of a player on a resource is a convex function of her weight.
We now briefly discuss these assumptions. Assumption 1 is standard in congestion-
type settings. For example, linear cost functions have obvious applications in
many network models, as do queueing delay functions, while higher degree poly-
nomials (such as quartic) have been proposed as realistic models of road traf-
fic [22]. Assumption 2 asks that the cost-sharing method only looks at how play-
ers generate costs and does not discriminate between them in any other way.
Assumption 3 asks that the curvature of the cost shares is consistent, i.e., given
Assumption 1, that the share of a player on a resource is a convex function of her
weight (otherwise, we would get that the share of the player increases in a slower
than convex way but the total cost of the constant weight players increases in
a convex way, which we view as unfair). We note that our upper bounds are
robust and apply to general equilibrium concepts that are guaranteed to exist
for all cost-sharing methods.
SV based POS bounds: Studying the POS is most well-motivated in settings
where a trusted mediator or some other authority can place the players in an
initial configuration and they will not be willing to deviate from it. For this
reason, the POS is a very interesting concept, especially for games possessing a
PNE. Hence, we focus on cost sharing methods which always induce games with
a PNE. For SV cost sharing, we prove an upper bound on the POS which holds
for all sets of cost functions that satisfy Assumption 1. We show that for the
interesting case of polynomials of bounded degree d, this upper bound is d+ 1,
which is asymptotically tight and always very close to the lower bound in [7].
Moreover, we show that this linear dependence on the maximum degree d
is very fragile. To do so, we consider a parameterized class of weighted Shapley
values, where players with larger weight get an advantage or disadvantage, which
is determined by a single parameter γ. When γ = 0 this recovers the SV. For
all other values γ 6= 0, we show that the POS is very close and for γ > 0 even
matches the upper bound on the price of anarchy in [10]. In other words, for
this case the POS and the POA coincide, which we found very surprising, in
particular because the upper bound in [10] even applies to general cost-sharing
methods. We note that these weighted Shapley values are the only cost-sharing
methods that guarantee existence of a PNE and satisfy Assumption 2 [10, 11].
1.2 Related Work and Comparison to Previous Results
POA. The POA was proposed in [15]. Most work on the inefficiency of equilibria
for weighted congestion games has focused on PS. Tight bounds for the case of
linear cost functions have been obtained in [3, 8]. The case of bounded degree
polynomials was resolved in [1] and subsequent work [4, 9, 18] concluded the
study of PS. In particular, [18] formalized the smoothness framework which shows
how robust POA bounds (i.e., POA bounds that apply to general equilibrium
concepts) are obtained.
Further cost-sharing methods have been considered in [10, 14]. Here, [14]
provides tight bounds for the SV in games with convex cost functions, while [10]
proves that the SV is optimal among the methods that guarantee the existence
of a PNE and that PS is near-optimal in general, for games with polynomial
cost functions. The authors also show tight bounds on the marginal contribution
method (which charges a player the increase her presence causes to the joint cost)
in games with polynomial costs. Optimality of the SV in closely related settings
has also been discussed in [13, 19].
POS. The term price of stability was introduced in [2] for the network cost-
sharing game, which was further studied in [5, 6, 14] for weighted players and
various cost-sharing methods. With respect to congestion games, results on the
POS are only known for polynomial unweighted games, for which [7] provides
exact bounds. Work in [13, 19] studies the POS of the Shapley value in related
settings.
Comparison to previous work. Our POA results greatly generalize the work
on cost-sharing methods for weighted congestion games and give a recipe for
tight bounds in a large array of applications. Prior to our work only a handful
of cost-sharing methods have been tightly analyzed. Our results facilitate the
better design of such systems, beyond the optimality criteria considered in [10].
For example, the SV has the drawback that it can’t be computed efficiently,
while PS (on top of not always inducing a PNE) might have equilibria that
are hard to compute. In cases where existence and efficient computation of a
PNE is considered important, the designer might opt for a different cost-sharing
method, such as a priority based one (that fixes a weight-dependent ordering of
the players and charges them the marginal increase they cause to the joint cost
in this order) which has polynomial time computable shares and equilibria. Our
results show how the inefficiency of equilibria is quantified for all such possible
choices, to help evaluate the tradeoffs between different options. Our work closely
parallels the work on network cost-sharing games in [14], which provides tight
bounds for general cost-sharing methods.
Our POS upper bound is the first for weighted congestion games that applies
to any class of convex costs. The work in [19] presents SV POS bounds in a more
general setting with non-anonymous but submodular cost functions. In a similar
vein, [13] presents tight POS bounds on the SV in games with non-anonymous
costs, by allowing any cost function and parameterizing by the number of players
in the game, i.e., they show that for the set of all cost functions the POS of the
Shapley value is Θ(n log n) and for the set of supermodular cost functions it
becomes n, where n is the number of players. These upper bounds apply to
our games as well, however we adopt a slightly different approach. We allow an
infinite number of players for our bounds to hold and parameterize by the set of
possible cost functions, to capture the POS of different applications. For example,
for polynomials of degree at most d, we show that the POS is at most d + 1,
even when n→∞. Observe that for unweighted games PS and SV are identical.
Thus, the lower bound in [7], which approaches d+1, also applies to our setting,
showing that our bound for polynomials is asymptotically tight.
Our lower bounds on the POS for the parameterized class of weighted Shap-
ley values build on the corresponding lower bounds on the POA in [10]. Our
construction matches these bounds by ensuring that the instance possesses a
unique Nash equilibrium. Together with our upper bound this shows an inter-
esting contrast: For the special case of SV the POS is exponentially better than
the POA, but as soon as we give some weight dependent priorities to the players,
the POA and the POS essentially coincide.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present our model in more detail. We write N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
for the players and E = {1, 2, . . . ,m} for the resources. Each player i ∈ N has
a positive weight wi and a strategy set Pi, each element of which is a subset
of the resources, i.e., Pi ⊆ 2E . We write P = (P1, . . . , Pn) for an outcome,
with Pi ∈ Pi the strategy of player i. Let Se(P ) = {i : e ∈ Pi} be the set of
users of e and fe(P ) =
∑
i∈Se(P ) wi be the total weight on e. The joint cost on e
is Ce(fe(P )) = fe(P ) · ce(fe(P )), with ce a function that is drawn from a given
set of allowable functions C. We write χie(P ) for the cost share of player i on
resource e. These shares are such that
∑
i∈Se(P ) χie(P ) = Ce(fe(P )). We make
the following assumptions on the cost-sharing method and the set of allowable
cost functions:
(1) Every function that can appear in the game is continuous, nondecreasing,
and convex. We also make the mild technical assumption that C is closed under
dilation, i.e., that if c(x) ∈ C, then also c(a · x) ∈ C for a > 0. We note that
without loss of generality, every C is also closed under scaling, i.e., if c(x) ∈ C,
then also a · c(x) ∈ C for a > 0 (this is given by simple scaling and replication
arguments).
(2) Given a player set S and a cost function c, suppose we alter the players
(e.g., change their weights or identities) and the cost function c in a manner
such that the cost generated by every subset of S on c remains unchanged. (For
example suppose we initially have two players with weights 1 and 2 and cost
function c(x) = x2 and we modify them so that the weights are now 2 and 4
and the cost function is now c(x) = x2/4.) Our second assumption states that
the cost shares of the players will remain the same. In effect, we ask that the
cost-sharing method only charges players based on how they contribute to the
joint cost. We also assume, without loss of generality, that if the costs of all
subsets of Sˆ = {1, 2, . . . , k} are scaled versions of those corresponding to S =
{1, 2, . . . , k}, then the cost shares are also simply scaled by the same factor (again
this is given by simple scaling and replication arguments).
(3) Since each cost share is a function of the cost function and player set on
a resource, we will also write ξc(i, S) for the share of a player i when the cost
function is c and the player set is S. This means that the cost share of player i on
resource e can be written both as χie(P ) and as ξce(i, Se(P )). Our third assump-
tion now states that the expression ξce(i, Se(P )) is a continuous, nondecreasing,
and convex function of the weight of player i. This is something to expect from
a reasonable cost-sharing method, given that the joint cost on the resource is a
continuous nondecreasing convex function of the weight of player i.
The pure Nash equilibrium (PNE) condition on an outcome P states that for
every player i it must be the case that:∑
e∈Pi
χie(P ) ≤
∑
e∈P ′i
χie(P
′
i , P−i), for every P
′
i ∈ Pi. (1)
The social cost in the game will be the sum of the player costs, i.e.,
C(P ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈Pi
χie(P ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈Pi
ξce(i, Se(P )) =
∑
e∈E
fe(P ) · ce(fe(P )). (2)
Let P be the set of outcomes and PN be the set of PNE outcomes of the game.
Then the price of anarchy (POA) is defined as POA =
maxP∈PN C(P )
minP∈P C(P )
, and the
price of stability (POS) is defined as POS =
minP∈PN C(P )
minP∈P C(P )
. The POA and POS
for a class of games are defined as the largest such ratios among all games in the
class.
Weighted Shapley Values. The weighted Shapley value defines how the cost
Ce(·) of resource e is partitioned among the set of players Se using e. Given
an ordering pi of the players in Se, the marginal cost increase by players i ∈ Se
is C(fpii +wi)−C(fpii ), where fpii is the total weight of players preceding i in the
ordering. For a given distribution Π over orderings, the cost share of player i
is Epi∼Π [C(fpii +wi)−C(fpii )]. For the weighted Shapley value, the distribution
over orderings is given by a sampling parameter λi for each player i. The last
player of the ordering is picked proportional to the sampling parameter λi. This
process is then repeated iteratively for the remaining players.
As in [10], we study a parameterized class of weighted Shapley values defined
by a parameter γ. For this class λi = w
γ
i for all players i. For γ = 0 this reduces
to the (normal) Shapley value (SV), where we have a uniform distribution over
orderings.
3 Tight POA Bounds for General Cost-Sharing Methods
We first generalize the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework of [18] to accommodate
any cost-sharing method and set of possible cost functions. Suppose we identify
positive parameters λ and µ < 1 such that for every cost function in our allowable
set c ∈ C, and every pair of sets of players T and T ∗, we get∑
i∈T∗
ξc(i, T ∪ {i}) ≤ λ · wT∗ · c(wT∗) + µ · wT · c(wT ), (3)
where wS =
∑
i∈S wi for any set of players S. Then, for P a PNE and P
∗ the
optimal solution, we would get
C(P )
(2)
=
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈Pi
ξce(i, Se(P ))
(1)
≤
∑
i∈N
∑
e∈P∗i
ξce(i, Se(P ) ∪ {i})
=
∑
e∈E
∑
i∈Se(P∗)
ξce(i, Se(P ) ∪ {i})
(3)
≤
∑
e∈E
λ · wSe(P∗)ce(wSe(P∗)) + µ · wSe(P ) · ce(wSe(P ))
(2)
= λ · C(P ∗) + µ · C(P ). (4)
Rearranging (4) yields a λ/(1− µ) upper bound on the POA. The same bound
can be easily shown to apply to MNE and more general concepts (correlated
and coarse correlated equilibria), though we omit the details (see, e.g., [18] for
more). We then get the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Consider the following optimization program with variables λ, µ.
Minimize λ1−µ (5)
Subject to µ ≤ 1 (6)∑
i∈T∗ ξc(i, T ∪ {i}) ≤ λ · wT∗ · c(wT∗) + µ · wT · c(wT ),∀c, T, T ∗(7)
Every feasible solution yields a λ/(1 − µ) upper bound on the POA of the cost
sharing method given by ξc(i, S) and the set of cost functions C.
The upper bound holds for any cost-sharing method and set of cost functions.
We now proceed to show that the optimal solution to Program (5)-(7) gives a
tight upper bound when our assumptions described in Section 2 hold.
Theorem 1. Let (λ∗, µ∗) be the optimal point of Program (5)-(7). The POA
of the cost-sharing method given by ξc(i, S) and the set of cost functions C is
precisely λ∗/(1− µ∗).
Proof. First define ζc(y, x) for y, x > 0 as
ζc(y, x) = max
T∗:wT∗=y,T :wT=x
∑
i∈T∗
ξc(i, T ∪ {i}). (8)
With this definition, we can rewrite Program (5)-(7) as
Minimize λ1−µ (9)
Subject to µ ≤ 1 (10)
ζc(y, x) ≤ λ · y · c(y) + µ · x · c(x), ∀c ∈ C, x, y (11)
Observe that for every constraint, we can scale the weights of the players by
a factor a, dilate the cost function by a factor 1/a, and scale the cost function
by an arbitrary factor and keep the constraint intact (by Assumption 2). This
suggests we can assume that every constraint has y = 1 and c(1) = 1. Then we
rewrite Program (9)-(11) as
Minimize λ1−µ (12)
Subject to µ ≤ 1 (13)
ζc(1, x) ≤ λ+ µ · x · c(x), ∀c ∈ C, x (14)
The Lagrangian dual of Program (12)-(14) is
Minimize λ1−µ+
∑
c∈C,x>0
zcx · (ζc(1, x)− λ− µ · x · c(x)) + zµ · (µ− 1) (15)
Subject to zcx, zµ ≥ 0 (16)
Our primal is a semi-infinite program with an objective that is continuous, dif-
ferentiable, and convex in the feasible region, and with linear constraints. We
get that strong duality holds (see also [21, 23] for a detailed treatment of strong
duality in this setting). We first treat the case when the optimal value of the
primal is finite and is given by point (λ∗, µ∗). Before concluding our proof we
will explain how to deal with the case when the primal is infinite or infeasible.
The KKT conditions yield for the optimal λ∗, µ∗, z∗cx:
1
1− µ∗ =
∑
c∈C,x>0
z∗cx (17)
λ∗
(1− µ∗)2 =
∑
c∈C,x>0
z∗cx · x · c(x) (18)
Calling ηcx = z
∗
cx/
∑
c∈C,x>0 z
∗
cx and dividing (18) with (17) we get
λ∗
1− µ∗ =
∑
c∈C,x>0
ηcx · x · c(x). (19)
By (19) and the fact that all constraints for which z∗cx > 0 are tight (by comple-
mentary slackness), we get∑
c∈C,x>0
ηcx · ζc(1, x) =
∑
c∈C,x>0
ηcx · x · c(x). (20)
Lower bound construction. Let T = {(c, x) : z∗cx > 0}. The construction starts
off with a single player i, who has weight 1 and, in the PNE, uses a single
resource ei by herself. The cost function of resource ei is an arbitrary function
from C such that cei(1) 6= 0 (it is easy to see that such a function exists, since C
is closed under dilation, unless all function are 0, which is a trivial case) scaled
so that cei(1) =
∑
(c,x)∈T ηcx ·ζc(1, x). The other option of player i is to use a set
of resources, one for each (c, x) ∈ T with cost functions ηcx · c(·). The resource
corresponding to each (c, x) is used in the PNE by a player set that is equivalent
to the T that maximizes the expression in (8) for the corresponding c, x. We
now prove that player i does not gain by deviating to her alternative strategy.
The key point is that due to convexity of the cost shares (Assumption 3), the
worst case T ∗ in definition (8) will always be a single player. Then we can see
that the cost share of i on each (c, x) resource in her potential deviation will
be ηcx · ζc(1, x). It then follows that she is indifferent between her two strategies.
Note that the PNE cost of i is
∑
(c,x)∈T ηcx · ζc(1, x), which by (19) and (20) is
equal to λ∗/(1−µ∗). Also note that if player i could use her alternative strategy
by herself, her cost would be 1.
We now make the following observation which allows us to complete the
lower bound construction: Focus on the players and resources of the previous
paragraph. Suppose we scale the weight of player i, as well as the weights of the
users of the resources in her alternative strategy by the same factor a > 0. Then,
suppose we dilate the cost functions of all these resources (the one used by i in
the PNE and the ones in her alternative strategy) by a factor 1/a so that the
costs generated by the players go back to the values they had in the previous
paragraph. Finally, suppose we scale the cost functions by an arbitrary factor b >
0. We observe that the fact that i has no incentive to deviate is preserved (by
Assumption 2) and the ratio of PNE cost versus alternative cost for i remains
the same, i.e., λ∗/(1− µ∗). This suggests that for every player generated by our
construction so far in the PNE, we can repeat these steps by looking at her
weight and PNE cost and appropriately constructing her alternative strategy
and the users therein. After repeating this construction for a large number of
layers M →∞, we complete the instance by creating a single resource for each of
the players in the final layer. The cost functions of these resources are arbitrary
nonzero functions from C scaled and dilated so that each one of these players is
indifferent between her PNE strategy and using the newly constructed resource.
Consider the outcome that has all players play their alternative strategies
and not the ones they use in the PNE. Evey player other than the ones in the
final layer would have a cost λ∗/(1 − µ∗) smaller, as we argued above. We can
now see that, by (20), the cost of every player in the PNE is the same as that
of the players in the resources of her alternative strategy. This means the cost
across levels of our construction is identical and the final layer is negligible,
since M →∞. This proves that the cost of the PNE is λ∗/(1− µ∗) times larger
than the outcome that has all players play their alternative strategies, which
gives the tight lower bound.
Note on case with primal infeasibility. Recall that during our analysis we as-
sumed that the primal program (12)-(14) had a finite optimal solution. Now
suppose the program is either infeasible or µ = 1, which means the minimizer
yields an infinite value. This implies that, if we set µ arbitrarily close to 1,
then there exists some c ∈ C, such that, for any arbitrarily large λ, there ex-
ists x > 0 such that ζc(1, x) > λ+µ ·x · c(x). We can rewrite this last expression
as ζc(1, x)/(x · c(x)) > µ + λ/(x · c(x)), which shows we have c, x values such
that ζc(1, x) is arbitrarily close to x · c(x) or larger (since µ is arbitrarily close
to 1). We can then replace λ with λ′ such that the constraint becomes tight. It
is not hard to see that these facts give properties parallel to (19) and (20) by
setting ηcx = 1 for our c, x and every other such variable to 0. Then our lower
bound construction goes through for this arbitrarily large λ′/(1−µ), which shows
we can construct a lower bound with as high POA as desired. uunionsq
4 Shapley Value POS
In this section we study the POS for a class of weighted Shapley values, where
the sampling parameter of each player i is defined by λi = w
γ
i for some γ.
We start with an upper bound on the POS for the case that γ = 0, i.e., for
the Shapley value (SV) cost-sharing method. For the SV, existence of a PNE
has been shown in [14] with the help of the following potential function, which
is defined for an arbitrary ordering of the players:
Φ(P ) =
∑
e∈E
Φe(P ) =
∑
e∈E
∑
i∈Se(P )
ξce(i, {j : j ≤ i, j ∈ Se(P )}). (21)
We first prove the following lemma which is the main tool for proving our
upper bound on the POS.
Lemma 2. Suppose we are given an outcome of the game and suppose we sub-
stitute any given player i with two players who have weight wi/2 each and who
use the exact same resources as i. Then the value of the potential function will
be at most the same as before the substitution.
Proof. First rename the players so that the substituted player i has the highest
index. Assign indices i′ and i′′ to the new players, with i′′ > i′ > i. On every
resource e that is used by these players, the potential decreases by ξce(i, Se(P )),
while it increases by ξce(i
′, Se(P ) ∪ {i′} \ {i}) + ξce(i′′, Se(P ) ∪ {i′, i′′} \ {i}).
Hence, it suffices to show that
ξce(i
′, Se(P ) ∪ {i′} \ {i}) + ξce(i′′, Se(P ) ∪ {i′, i′′} \ {i}) ≤ ξce(i, Se(P )). (22)
For simplicity, in what follows call ξ = ξce(i, Se(P )), ξ
′ = ξce(i
′, Se(P )∪{i′}\{i}),
and ξ′′ = ξce(i
′′, Se(P ) ∪ {i′, i′′} \ {i}). Consider every ordering pi of the players
in Se(P ) \ {i} and every possible point in the ordering where a new player can
be placed. If we assume that player is i and we average all possible joint cost
jumps i can cause (by definition of the SV) we get ξ. Similarly, with i′, we get ξ′.
If we repeat the same thought process for i′′, we are not getting ξ′′, since the
position of i′ in the ordering is unspecified. However, we get a value that is larger
than ξ′′ if we always place i′ right before i′′. Call this larger value ξˆ′′. Observe
that if we take every ordering pi of Se(P ) \ {i} and in every possible position,
we place first i′ and then i′′ and we take the average of the combined joint cost
jump that they cause, we will be getting ξ′ + ξˆ′′, which, as we explained is at
least ξ′ + ξ′′. Now note that this combined jump of the two players will also be
the jump that i would cause in that particular position (since wi′ + wi′′ = wi),
which means ξ′ + ξˆ′′ = ξ, which in turn gives ξ ≥ ξ′ + ξ′′ and completes the
proof. uunionsq
By repeatedly applying Lemma 2, we can break the total weight on each
resource in players of infinitesimal size and the value of the potential will not
increase. This suggests:
Φe(P ) ≥
∫ fe(P )
0
ce(x)dx. (23)
Now call P ∗ the optimal outcome and P = arg minP ′ Φ(P ′) the minimizer of the
potential function, which is, by definition, also a PNE. We get:
C(P ∗)
(21)
≥ Φ(P ∗) Def.P≥ Φ(P )
(23)
≥
∑
e∈E
∫ fe(P )
0
ce(x)dx
=
∑
e∈E
∫ fe(P )
0
ce(x)dx∑
e∈E fe(P ) · ce(fe(P ))
· C(P ) ≥ min
e∈E
∫ fe(P )
0
ce(x)dx
fe(P ) · ce(fe(P )) · C(P ).
Rearranging yields the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The POS of the SV with C the set of allowable cost functions is
at most maxc∈C,x>0
x·c(x)∫ x
0
c(x′)dx′ .
Corollary 1. For polynomials with non-negative coefficients and degree at most d,
the POS of the SV is at most d+1, which asymptotically matches the lower bound
of [7] for unweighted games.
In the remainder of this section, we show that this linear dependence on
the maximum degree d of the polynomial cost functions is very fragile. More
precisely, for all values γ 6= 0, we show an exponential (in d) lower bound which
matches the corresponding lower bound on the POA in [10]. Our bound for γ > 0
even matches the upper bound on the POA [10], which holds for the weighted
Shapley value in general. Our constructions modify the corresponding instances
in [10], making sure that they have a unique Nash equilibrium. Due to page
restrictions we defer the proof to our full version.
Theorem 3. For polynomial cost functions with non-negative coefficients and
maximum degree d, the POS for the class of weighted Shapley values with sam-
pling parameters λi = w
γ
i is at least
(a) (2
1
d+1 − 1)−(d+1), for all γ > 0, and
(b) (d+ 1)d+1, for all γ < 0.
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